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Abstract 
The United Nations universal declaration of 1948 celebrated the belief in human rights as a great moral value. But 
what does ‘the belief in human rights’ precisely mean? What exactly are human rights? Admitting that human rights 
exist may cause difficulties for certain moral thoeries and raise various questions. Some questions concern the 
problem of the justification of human rights: are these grounded on nature, that is on something unalterable and 
absolute, or are they the product of history and social life? The various theories of human rights answer these 
questions differently. This paper, therefore, examines the controversial question of the justification of human rights 
by comparing the two main forms of argument which are developed by the predominate theories of human rights: 
naturalization and denaturalization. After showing the advantages and disadvantages of these rival arguments, the 
author draws some conclusions regarding the issue of justification of concepts, such as the concept of human rights, 
on which our present social life appears to be intrinsically based.  
  
  
The Universal declaration of 1948 celebrated the belief in human rights as a great moral value. 
But, what does this belief mean exactly? What are human rights precisely? Admitting that human 
rights exist may cause difficulties for moral theories, raising different questions, about the 
analysis of the concept of human rights, of the advantages or disadvantages of the rights 
vocabulary, or about the content of these rights or even about their justification, whether there is 
any ground for believing in something universal and inalienable like human rights.  
The problem of justification is particularly relevant: are human rights grounded on nature, that is 
on something unalterable and absolute or are they the product of history and social life? The 
moral theories of human rights answer differently. Some maintain that human rights represents 
the moral rights that "human beings have in virtue of being human" (1), and others, on the 
contrary, say that human rights are "the choice of a particular moral vision of human potentiality 
and the institutions for realising that vision"(2) or "a proposal concerning the morally appropriate 
way of treating men and organizing society" (3). 
The crucial point, so, lies in the choice between nature and history: "Any right-based moral or 
political theory has to face the issue whether the rights it endorses are ‘natural’ or ‘human’ 
rights, universally valid and determinable a priori by some kind of reason, or historically 
determined in and by the concrete institutions of a particular society, to be found out by analysis 
of its actual laws and practices" (4). 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to investigate the controversial question of the justification of 
human rights by comparing the two main forms of argument as to their existence, naturalization 
and denaturalization which are developed inside the main moral theories of human rights. After 
showing the advantages and disadvantages of these rival arguments, we shall try to draw some 
conclusions that could throw some light on the question of the justification of a concept, like that 
of human rights, on which our present social life appears to be intrinsically based. 
Let’s begin with some general remarks.  
Any moral theory that claims to be right-based ought to be able to derive all the ethical relevant 
notions from that of rights. Traditionally, rights have been included in theoretical patterns like 
consequentialism, utilitarianism and deontology (5). But the challenge of rights and, in this case, 
specifically of human rights is about the possibility to define their meaning and content without 
any reference to other notions, like those of duty, utility or good: rights are to be based only on 
themselves. As J. Mackie wrote, "on reflection, we might find an assignment of [...] rights to 
persons a more acceptable starting point for critical moral thinking than any other" (6). 
Moreover, a theory of human rights has to define clearly what it means by human rights, in what 
way each individual is a bearer of those higher and universal rights to life, freedom and well-
being which seem to need only their ‘naturality’ as justification. That is, any ethical theory of 
human rights, as noticed, will have to answer precisely the question whether human rights are to 
be based on history or nature.  
Historically, the most influential moral theories of human rights have been those belonging to the 
tradition of the Law of Nature. In these theories, human rights depend directly on the natural 
order and are subject to a universal moral law, superior to positive law. However, the attempt to 
explain the notion of human rights by some appeal to natural order can be found also in the 
contemporary debate inside the so called ethical naturalistic theories of human rights. This 
attempt is made in two ways: either in scientific and empirically ascertainable terms by means of 
some cognitivist theory or in rationalistic and absolutistic terms, grounding the notion of human 
rights on the giusnaturalistic or aristotelic-tomistic tradition. 
But it is to be pointed out that in the course of history human rights have mostly appeared as a 
vindication of freedom against the established power and as social and economical demands, 
following a path which usually sees the notion of human rights as the contemporary inheritance 
of the modern concept of natural rights. This might mean that nowadays the notion of human 
rights no longer needs to be based on nature, but that it represents human requests, historically 
defined and morally and politically justifiable, by means of some non-naturalistic theory.  
But it is not so: if human rights exist, it is said, they are to be based on human nature, on the 
simple fact that individuals are human beings. If it is so, how is human nature to be defined? 
What are the consequences of this assumption on the ethical theories of rights?  
Let us answer these questions through the examination of the two main types of human rights 
moral theories mentioned above, the naturalistic one and the non-naturalistic one. 
Naturalistic theories. 
The present revival of natural rights theories is mainly due to Robert Nozick’s view (7). He made 
of the inviolable freedom of individuals and of the absolute control of property in the self and its 
possessions the natural rights which constitute the foundation of a libertarian and well ordered 
society. The core of Nozick’s theory lies in the opening sentence of his Anarchy, State and 
utopia: "Individuals have rights" (8) which express their ‘separate existence’ according to the 
Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not simply means. 
The problem of their justification soon arises: an idea of natural rights like this, in fact, meets 
with various epistemological difficulties. In general, any naturalistic theory, that is to say any 
theory which takes completely the field of morality from the empirical realty of human life, must 
explain at least three points: whether and in what way these natural rights are inalienable, 
prescriptible, forfeitable, defeasible or self-evident, what the source of these rights is and, last, 
what it means to assign them to people. For this reason, often the philosophers of natural rights 
do not agree on the question whether what makes a right a natural right and, furthermore, what 
makes such rights natural. As a consequence, the epistemological difficulties have brought to 
distinguish between those theories which, in some way, refer to the classical or modern tradition 
of natural rights and those ones which appeal exclusively to empirical data which are 
scientifically ascertainable, refusing any reference to the law of nature or to jusnaturalistic 
principles. 
Therefore, we can distinguish three main kinds of arguments which characterize the naturalistic 
ethical theories of human rights: first, the human rights theories which refer to modern 
jusnaturalism; second, the theories which go back to the aristotelic-tomistic tradition; and last, 
those naturalistic theories which try to find a scientific basis of the ethics of human rights 
without any reference to the law of nature, but appealing exclusively to empirical ascertainable 
data. 
These arguments make use of three different meanings of the term ‘natural’: one which explains 
ethics through the same metaphysical and ontological principles employed to explain reality; the 
other which establishes that what is natural is a synonym of what is rational; and a third one, 
which refers to the term natural as meaning empirically verifiable. The first two meanings are 
twisted together, in different ways, in jusnaturalism and in the aristotelic-tomistic tradition. The 
third belongs to those contemporary naturalistic theories which derive from empirism and are 
criticized by the anti-cognitivists and by those maintaining the naturalistic fallacy and Hume’s 
law. 
With all the theories using the term natural in these ways, we are faced with the problem to ask 
to what extent the consideration of facts concerning human nature determines moral conclusions. 
One way or another, we face a ‘naturalistic reduction’ of the notion of human rights. Why a 
naturalistic reduction? 
Since it is a general conviction that "if there are such things as human rights, then they are rights 
we have independently of laws, conventions or special moral relations" (9), it is easy to see them 
as universal and inalienable. And what can the source of these rights be if not a law of nature, 
universal and inalienable? Actually, at the origin of the idea of natural rights there is the attempt 
to affirm, appealing to human nature and to a higher justice, that individual liberty has 
inestimable value above or against the established power.  
However, the link between the idea of natural rights and that of the law of nature is controversial 
and widely debated. Surely it seems interesting to connect natural rights, as something 
independent from existing laws, to a universal and incontrovertible ‘moral’ law. But there are 
philosophers who see natural rights as more parasitic of the vocabulary than of the content of 
natural law: they would be, as K.R. Minogue wrote, "an assertive and individualistic version of 
what appears in the [...] philosophy of natural law as an elaborate and compendious account of 
human moral obligations"(10). In this sense, natural rights would not depend on the law of nature 
for their justification and could be seen as something less obscure.  
Leaving aside this question, however, the idea of natural rights still arouses interest and 
fascination. The main reason seems to be that it ensures a solid basis for human rights: "The firm 
ground needed for the idea of human rights isn’t likely to be secured without the basis promised 
by natural rights theories" (11). Only by giving human rights an empirical ascertainable basis or 
an ontological and rational one, are we convinced that we can explain their universality and 
unconditionality and, besides, that we can allow them to be of some weight: it is said, in fact, that 
if a human right does not depend on a natural fact and has no legal force, what weight can it 
have? 
Common sense is the first to advocate the naturalistic reduction. Individuals possess human 
rights only in virtue of their being ‘by nature’ human beings and rights are conceived as 
something vague, abstract and morally universal and inalienable, obscuring their source and 
value. In the name of these universal natural rights it seems possible to challenge the dictates of 
all existing governments and the pressure of every society if they seem oppressive, that is if they 
do not recognize the natural rights of every individual.  
Ethical theories, then, would imitate common sense, sharing with it the abstractness and 
imperscrutable appeal to natural rights or to the law of nature and hiding, therefore, the 
eminently relational value of the moral discourse. As it has been noticed, "if moral philosophy or 
‘moral science’ is concerned to guide action, if its content is a set of [...] commendations, 
prescriptions, demands, commands or requirements, then we have to recognize that the moral 
predicates are in fact relations" (12) and relations are constituted at least by two terms, the 
demander and what is demanded. The moral language adopted by common thought and by the 
naturalistic theories connected with it, would conceal the source of the requirements expressed 
by natural rights, by dealing with incomplete relations. That is, ethical theories would come to 
present as impartial what is partial, as desiderable what is simply desired, making the language 
of human rights the instrument of a normative science which can explain the naturalness and 
rationality of human rights. Therefore, in some ways, the various naturalistic theories of human 
rights present the same characteristics, which can be summarized in the four following points 
(13):  
in these theories rights are included; 
such rights are affirmed as morally fundamental; 
the possession of such rights by individuals is linked to the possession of some natural property; 
a natural property being the condition for a human right, in these theories there is necessarily 
some form of realistic epistemology. 
While the first and the second characteristics may be satisfied by any theory of rights, what 
makes an ethical theory a naturalistic theory are specifically the third and fourth characteristics. 
Besides, the various naturalistic theories can be distinguished for the way the third point is 
exemplified. Let us see in what way. 
The jusnaturalistic or aristotelic-tomistic theories of natural law refer to human nature as 
something metaphysical, essential and immutable, pertaining to all human beings and to 
rationality, as a distinctive trait of the human species. As something rational and natural, the law 
of nature is common to all men. Such law is however difficult to justify. (14). "The doctrine of 
natural law [...] is very obscure [...] It seems a strange law which is unwritten, has never been 
enacted and may be unobserved without penalty" (15). Even if we must recognize the plurality of 
the natural law tradition and, so avoid the risk of oversimplifying, one of the basic features of 
this tradition seems to be its being general and abstract. These features are the cause of the 
limited value of the whole doctrine of the law of nature as a practical ethics: "The idea of natural 
law provides no shortcuts for moral reasoning" (16). And, if natural rights are conceived as an 
‘emanation’ of this natural law, they meet with the same controversies (17).  
Nevertheless, as was said above, natural rights are affirmed even independently from the natural 
law. H.L.A. Hart, for example, in the attempt to safeguard, at least in part, the jusnaturalistic 
tradition and, at the same time, avoid the difficulties connected with admitting the existence of a 
natural law, defined the subject of rights ‘any adult human being capable of choice’ and affirmed 
that "if there are any moral rights at all, it follows that there is at least one natural right, the equal 
right of all men to be free" (18).  
Therefore, Hart tries to defend the existence of traditional natural rights, but refusing any appeal 
to a law of nature or to a higher order and stating, as it where, the natural value (that is, intrinsic 
to human nature) of individual liberty. The right to liberty is in fact defined as a natural right 
because it is possessed by all men, as human beings and because it is not created or granted by 
the voluntary action of man. But this right is not absolute or incontrovertible: "My thesis is not as 
ambitious as the traditional theories of natural rights; for, although on my view all men are 
equally entitled to be free [...] no man has an absolute or unconditional right to do or not to do 
any particular thing or to be treated in any particular way" (19). Thus, this view is an example of 
how the complex question of the relationship between natural rights and the law of nature is 
approached. However, it is to be noticed that, even avoiding the adoption of the idea of natural 
law, the problem to justify the meaning and source of this alleged natural liberty remains. 
In order to escape this problem also, some have tried to defend the traditional idea of natural 
rights, by adopting actually only the form and changing the content. K. Minogue wrote, in fact, 
that "the natural rights doctrine is a vindication of the space people need to play the game of life" 
(20). To wit, natural rights, being completely autonomous from the law of nature, are not 
demands, but proposals concerning the changing of the rules of the game of life. According to 
Minogue, "what seems [...] to have been less recognized is the significance of natural rights in 
opening spaces within which people who felt themselves suffocated by the repetitive 
purposiveness of their lives might be allowed to play a part in the wider game of life" (21). If it 
were true that natural rights are something different from natural law, nevertheless, this does not 
mean that their significance lies in their relation to the rules of life: if we conceive natural rights 
in this way, it seems we change their traditional significance. A special conception of life then, 
that is a kind of ‘wider game’, strongly influences Minogue’s comprehension of the meaning of 
all the tradition of natural rights.  
The empirical naturalistic theories, instead, completely refuse any appeal to tradition, both of the 
natural law and natural rights: they are based either on empirical ascertainable elements, like 
goods or needs, or on rationality, intended, however, as a contextualized quality, that is founded 
on a scientific but not metaphysical view of the ability of human beings to understand reality.  
The needs theories, at a first glance, seem to be very plausible, because human needs represent 
an important part of ‘human nature’. They seem also attractive, because such needs (at least in 
principle) appear scientifically determinable, in this way easily avoiding the problem about the 
development of a convincing view on human nature, from which to derive a list of human rights. 
According to the needs theories, human rights are "norms that regulate actions by the norm-
receiver relative to other human beings in general and their need-satisfaction in particular" (22) 
or, in other words, "are statements of basic needs and interests" (23). That is, a ‘human need’ is 
not intended as a mere desire or interest, but as a basic and universal need, which everyone has 
simply because they are human.  
If we closely examine the meaning of these theories, however, we meet with some difficulties. 
The most important one is about the link between ‘X is good for human beings’ and ‘there is a 
human right to X’. Needs theorists seem to fail to justify the needs-rights link: if the needs 
referred to are only the primary ones, then they are inadequate as the source of human rights, 
since they concern the maintenance of life, rather than its quality; but, if we refer also to the 
secondary needs, more abstract and general, then their empirical status is no longer scientifically 
ascertainable, as instead this kind of theory claims. As a consequence, it would follow that, as it 
has been pointed out, "even leaving aside the alleged problems of inferring values from facts, 
[...] needs theories ultimately fail because they simply are not scientific theories and yet have 
based themselves on their alleged empiricism" (24). 
The naturalistic theories based on the concept of rationality, then, refuse the reductionism of 
contemporary thought (developing, some way or another, a kind of neo-aristoelic metaphysics) 
and are convinced they can escape the difficulties met with by the natural law theories, affirming 
that "natural rights theory does not depend on the view that the nature of man, for example, 
consists of some timeless, intrinsic essence found in everyone, i.e., a metaphysical view of 
natures. Instead, it is sufficient to be able to defend an epistemological view of natures, whereby 
what human nature is may be demonstrated from what we know about reality, i.e., by a rational 
integration and differentiation of the evidence of reality we are aware of" (25). The epistemology 
underlying this kind of theory, however, does not show less problems than those determined by 
the natural law theories. It is a cognitivst epistemology, which claims to determine the ethical 
universe on the basis of empirical knowledge, falling also in the naturalistic fallacy. Therefore, it 
meets with all the known criticisms made to the realistic and cognitivistic ethical theories, first of 
all that of deriving values from facts (26). 
In all these naturalistic theories, so, we face above all the problem of deriving values from facts: 
from facts concerning human nature, or epistemic rationality or the law of nature, the human 
rights are inferred, which are typically moral rights, standing for values regarded as fundamental 
in the life of human beings.  
The naturalist, nevertheless, insists on conceiving human rights as the vindication of some traits 
inherent in human nature. Some, like G. Vlastos or J. Feinberg (27), have tried to sidestep the 
question by proposing a non-reductionist naturalistic theory, in which the concept of human 
rights would be neutral as to the issues of ontology and moral epistemology. Human rights would 
be based on the human value, whose attribution to individuals does not involve the assignation of 
any property, but the expression of a disposition to respect towards the humanity of persons. 
Once again, however, as with the idea of human nature, we find ourselves facing the difficulty of 
defining precisely the idea of human value.  
The attempts to naturalize the notion of human rights, in conclusion, show some aspects of 
intrinsic weakness. First, they seem inadequate in explaining what it means to be a human being, 
without meeting with epistemologic and ‘metaphysical’ difficulties; second, as it is vague and 
obscure to affirm that human beings possess human rights in that they are human beings, from a 
naturalistic approach it is not possible to give a precise content to the notion of human rights, but 
only a rhetorical emphasis; and, finally, they seem to represent, on the logical level, a case of 
infringement of Hume’s law, as they derive norms and evaluations from descriptive premises on 
human nature. 
  
Non-naturalistic theories. 
  
In the light of all these difficulties, philosophers have proposed a denaturalized concept of 
human rights. Such a concept is based, in primis, on the recognition of the strictly moral and 
political content of human rights and on the awareness of their fundamental dependence on 
social institutions. In this sense, the doctrine of human rights would be a proposal concerning the 
morally appropriate way of dealing with men and of organizing society (28).  
Human nature ceases to be an ontological foundation and becomes essentially a "moral 
description of human possibilities" (29). That is, society and morality play a crucial role in 
determining how human potentialities are to be realized. We can quote here the view of the 
Italian philosopher N. Bobbio: "Human rights, however fundamental they are, are historical 
rights, that is born in certain circumstances [...] To talk about natural rights or fundamental 
inalienable or inviolable ones, means using expressions of persuasive language which have no 
theoretical value" (30). 
On these bases, it has been argued in favour of moral theories of rights in which the concept of 
human rights has a definite moral and social content and, therefore, is not independent of 
institutions. Human rights are no longer connected to the idea of natural law or, generally, of 
nature, but to the ethical-historical reality and are explained as a mixture of requests, vindications 
of liberty, power and immunity by people. The subject of human rights is the person as moral 
agent, responsible of rights and actions.  
Some important theories - that, for example, of C. Wellmann, A. Gewirth, R. Dworkin, A.I,. 
Melden, J. Rawls and J. Donnelly - have been offered without appealing to natural rights, but it 
seems not so easy to provide substantive arguments to undercut the difficulties involved in what 
we have defined the naturalistic approach to human rights.  
C. Wellmann, for example, has affirmed that human rights, according to the model of legal 
rights, consist of different elements (31) and are those moral rights that individuals have in front 
of the State, the rights that moral agents share with one another by means of institutions. In such 
a proposal, there is a real progress towards the understanding of the notion of human rights as a 
human and cultural product. However, the real problem is that, as public relations are given 
absolute priority, the single individuals and the various forms of private relations are excluded as 
addresses of human rights. Anyway, the value of this proposal lies in the attention given to the 
historical, social and political dimension of human rights. 
A. Gewirth’s theory of action, on the other hand, is an ambitious attempt to justify human rights 
by grounding them in the foundations of morality itself: in Gewirth’s perspective, human rights 
are implicit in the very idea of acting morally such that anyone who acknowledges that human 
individuals are moral agents must accept that they have certain equal rights. However, what 
emerges from Gewirth’s proposal is that human rights are prudential rather than moral rights, 
since they are grounded only in what the agent himself needs if he is to act purposively. Even 
with the recourse to what he calls the principle of generic consistency it seems he cannot avoid 
this consequence (32). 
Anyway, even the most celebrated contemporary attempt to delineate the features of a just 
society, that is J. Rawls’s A theory of justice, has its problems with human rights. In Rawls’s 
theory human rights are conceived as the rights of citizens rather than the rights of human beings 
since his theory is constructed for a body of people who form a political society rather than for 
the human race forming a moral community. So the main problem of Rawls’s theory with human 
rights is the relation between that rights and the hipotetical contract: if rights are antecedent to 
the contract, in accordance to the veil of ignorance they should be thought of as entirely formal 
categories which have yet to be given content by the contracting parties; if rights are included in 
the list of primary goods, they are not grounded on the contract, they not issue from the original 
position, as Rawls maintains (33). 
At this point we ask: can we argue in favour of a non-naturalistic approach to human rights? As 
regards the elements qualifying the naturalistic ethical theories of human rights, an approach 
trying to overcome the difficulties noticed above would be based on the following aspects: 
the concept of human rights is stated as prima facie, not as absolute and inalienable; 
the priority of rights is maintained on the basis of a descriptive or critical-reflective conception 
of normative ethics, refusing the idea that a moral normative science exists; 
points 1. and 2. are supported by a non-realistic and non-cognitivistic epistemological 
metaethics; 
human nature is not an immutable essence, but a mixture of elements and values, such as 
possibilities, interests, powers and immunities, dignity, rationality and liberty. 
This last point will be dealt with in the next paragraph. Let us now examine the other points. 
1. The issue of rights conflicts has attracted the attention of rights theorists for a long time and 
among them the suggestion to regard rights as prima facie and not as absolute has emerged (34). 
To say that a right is prima facie means exactly that it is not absolute and that, only case by case 
can we give a definite account of its weight. The notion of prima facie compared to that of being 
absolute seems to allow a more plausible conception of the universality that rights at any rate 
claim to the world. All individuals, in this perspective, can claim to have, prima facie, a 
universal right, because the indefinite weight of the notion ensures that all rights will be taken 
into consideration in the different circumstances and that their application will depend on the 
comparison and not on the opposition. Rights become relative and defeasible, this however does 
not establish their weakness but their realizability: "The fact that most of the basic rights are only 
prima facie ones, capable of being overridden in particular cases, does not mean that they are, 
like the rights that would be recognized in many utilitarian systems, merely derived principles 
whose rationale lies in their tendency to promote something else, say the general happiness. The 
suggested rights are basic, though defeasible [...] and the conflicts are to be resolved by 
balancing these prima facie rights themselves against one another, not by weighing their merits 
in terms of some different ultimate standard of value, such as utility" (35). 
As it has been noticed (36), the function of normative ethics, that is of analyzing our practices 
and our moral thought in view of action, can be effectively carried out also by a purely 
descriptive discipline. The task of such a discipline is, first of all, to direct us to an increasing 
understanding of the nature of ethics and the way it works. In examining the moral phenomena 
we do not claim to come to a prescriptive science and to guarantee a solid basis to rights, but to 
understand as much as possible their meaning and applications.  
If we give up the scientific and prescriptive demands, nevertheless, the ethical theories of human 
rights seem to lose the authority and ability to guide behaviour. The role of the law of nature, 
particularly, is not easily replaced. Its great force lies in fact in its being above positive laws, in 
defence of the highest principles of our moral conscience. As early as in the Antigone by 
Sophocles, when the laws of the state are unfair, the law of nature guarantees that there is a 
higher justice inscribed in haven, that shows us what is morally right. Even today, when we are 
faced with the necessity to vindicate a human right, we tend to do it not because it is prescribed 
by positive laws, but because it is fair and universally valid. For these reasons, natural law 
theories still turn up even in the most critical thinking. 
In order to go beyond the theoretical view proposed by the natural law, therefore, it is essential to 
keep some features that characterize it, such as the appeal to the universality of human rights and 
to the idea of authority raised by the laws of conscience, but to place them within a historical 
frame of some relevance. 
In this field, some form of non-cognitivist metaethics can be adopted, so avoiding the criticism 
based on the naturalistic fallacy and, at the same time, the ontological and metaphysical 
consequences of natural law. Thus, human rights can be explained on the basis of an ethical 
theory that does not claim to reach the strictness and objectivity of science, but interprets the 
moral phenomenon, for example in the light of Hume’s sentiments and artificial virtues or of 
some features not scientifically ascertainable, but morally comprehensible (37). In this non-
cognitivistic and non-realistic type of theory, in which moral sentences are not true or false and 
there is no correspondence between things or natural properties and values, human rights may 
become a practice, that is a mixture of rules, attitudes, behaviours and evaluations which tend 
towards universality, but do not demand it.  
Let us see now the last point by underlying the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
investigation carried out in this paper. 
  
  
Towards a mediation. 
  
Is there something which can justify human rights in their universality and moral authority 
besides nature? Can we answer the question about the meaning and content of human rights 
without being compelled to choose between nature and history? Perhaps we can. 
The way is shown by those theories of human rights that appeal to human possibilities, to the 
ability to make choices and to the value of the person’s dignity (38). In this sense, Kant was right 
to affirm that the person, as bearer of rights, is consonant with the moral law, capable of self-
determination. 
Human rights would primarily deal with what individuals can be and not with what they are. 
Then, they would have to do with the moral person and not the natural one, but they would not 
exclude, for this reason, a part of humanity from the world of rights (39). It would be true that 
"the human ‘nature’ that grounds human rights is [...] an essentially moral account of human 
possibilities" (40).  
Human rights would show, first of all, which opportunities are to be guaranteed, what a life 
worth of value that completely realizes the human being is to be like. That is, human nature 
definitely ceases to be an ‘ontological’ structure and appears as a ‘project’: "Human rights aim to 
establish and guarantee the conditions necessary for the development of the human person 
envisioned in the underlying moral theory of human nature" (41).  
In this way, what is good or proper for man would be, as it has been observed (42), something 
like Aristotle’s eudaimonia, that is it should come within the category of activity and, as "people 
differ radically about the kinds of life that they choose to pursue [...] and they choose 
successively to pursue various activities from time to time, not once and for all" (43), the 
concern of rights would be, first of all, to guarantee to each person to choose progressively how 
to live.  
Nature and history could overlap here: if human nature is ‘a moral description of human 
possibilities’ and if ‘people differ radically about the kinds of life that they choose to pursue’, 
historical and social development becomes an essential part of the realization of human nature in 
its highest values, human rights. 
In this paper ,therefore, the aim has not been to give a full explanation to the issues dealt with, 
but only to draw the attention to the complexity of the notion of human rights and of the 
problems about its justification. In spite of the results, it has to be underlined that what gives 
value to the different attempts, naturalistic and non-naturalistic ones, to justify human rights is 
the firm purpose to attribute a state of universality to the highest values of human existence. 
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